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REFUSALS TO CROSS PICKET LINES: PROTECTION OF
WORKERS FROM EMPLOYER REPRISALS*
THE picket line is one of labor's traditional methods of implementing a strike.1
If individuals not parties to the strike refuse to cross such a line,2 the picketed
employer will be unable to continue operations. But if the line is ignored by
such third persons, the employer may be able to keep his business in partial
operation and carry on a longer contest with the union. Because of this
important effect on the outcome of labor disputes, workers not parties to
strikes are strongly motivated to avoid crossing any picket line. Their refusals
may spring from pure sympathy, a desire to ensure later reciprocal action by
the pickets, 3 or fear of physical violence, economic retaliation, or social
ostracism. 4 In any event, the policy of observing all picket lines has become
one of the mores of organized labor.
* NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d Ill (2d Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 21
U.S.L. W=RE 3115 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1952); NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 189 F.2d
124 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951).
1. See, generally, GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW C. 12 (1949); LEsTER, ECONOMICS 01'
LABOR 612, 708, 870 (1947) ; PzRsoN, SURVEY OF LABOREcoNoMics 617 (1947). Begin-
ning with Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Supreme Court went far to
protect picketing as "free speech" under the First Amendment. But in recent years this
trend has been severely qualified. See, e.g., Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S, 470
(1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 US. 490 (1949). For full discus-
sion, see Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 HAiv. L. REv. 513 (1943);
Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 H.umv. L. REv. 180 (1942); Weinberg, Thornhill
to Hanke-The Picketing Puzzle, 20 U. or Cix. L. REv. 437 (1951) ; Note, 59 H.nv. L. REV.
1123 (1946).
2. In most cases the picket line is aimed more at other workers than toward
members of the general public. See Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor
Law, 48 MicH. L. REv. 767, 789 (1950). For the various techniques and purposes of
picket lines, see Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts, 10 N.C.L. Ray. 158, 186
n.135 (1931).
3. See Hand, J., in NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130
F.2d 503, 505-6 (2d Cir. 1942). Workers refusing to cross often not only seek to
insure future cooperation by the pickets, but aim more broadly at strengthening the
tradition of respect for all picket lines.
4. A truck driver, for example, is subject to expulsion from his union-often result-
ing in loss of employment-for crossing a teamsters' picket line. Cox, The Influence
of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MicH. L. REv. 767, 788 (1950). And although
the Taft-Hartley amendments to § 8(a) (3) of the NLRA, 61 STAT. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (Supp. 1951), have taken much of the sting out of loss of
union membership, the union can still put substantial pressure on its members to enforce
compliance with its rules.
For the social pressures involved, see WARNER & Low, THE SocIAL SysT= oF TIr
MODERN FACTORY (1947).
5. "It is almost a rule of trade union ethics for one labor union to respect the picket
line established by another." L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 868, 874
(1946).
NOTES
Where performance of a worker's job requires him to cross the picket line
of another union, his refusal to do so may injure his employer. Should the
picket line surround his own place of employment, refusal to cross would be
tantamount to a sympathy strike, often leading to partial or total shut-down.
And even where the line is around the plant of an employer other than the
worker's own, picket-line observance may hamper the operations of his own
employer by cutting off suppliers or outlets.
Whether or not employers can prevent such refusals by firing or other-
wise disciplining workers 6 depends upon the rights guaranteed the worker
by the National Labor Relations Act.7 Under Section 7 of that act. worhers
may engage in "concerted activities for mutual aid or protection." Should the
refusal to cross come within this provision, the employer's disciplinary action
would constitute an unfair labor practice 9 entitling the employee to reinstate-
ment and lost wages.'" On the other hand, should the refusal to cross fall
Many union constitutions contain provisions forbidding their members to cross picet
lines. See, e.g., Loc.u. BY-LAwS, ILLINOIS UNioN OF TELPHo0TE Wom s § 9 (rev. Sept.
11, 1944) ($50.00 fine for crossing picket line without union permission). See also other
union constitutions collected in PLrrisoN, HA N mroo OF Lexon UNiozis (1944).
The right of workers to honor picket lines is often incorporated in the collective bargaining
agreement. U.S. BuRAu OF LaB. STAT. BuLm, No. 66, UinoI A ix-_iE;r Pnovxsio;s
165 (1942).
6. Employers may wish to inflict a lesser punishment than outright dismissal on
the worker. The employer could demote him, as in NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,
189 F.2d 124, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951); remove accumulated seniority or
pension status; or in other ways deprive the worker of important privileges.
7. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1951).
S. "Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their ovm
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C § 157
(1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1951).
9. Section 8(a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(1) (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159(a)(1) (Supp. 1951).
Strikers engaged in ordinary economic strikes, commonly referred to as "economic
strikers," may not be demoted or fired for striking. But to enable the employer to keep
his business going during the strike, courts have permitted him to replace the striklers
permanently. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1933), 51
HARv. L. REv. 553. And the Ninth Circuit recently held that non-strihing worl:ers
may be given seniority over economic strikers. NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 1S9 F.2d
82 (9th Cir. 1951), 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 287.
When the strike is caused or prolonged by an employer unfair labor practice, the
strikers, so-called "unfair labor practice strikers," must be rehired at the end of the
strike even if it is necessary to discharge replacements. E.g., NLRB v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 130 F2d 919 (2d Cir. 1942); Deena Arthvare, Inc., S5 N.L.R.B. 732 (1949).
For discussion, see Daykin, Legalizcd Conccrtcd Activities undcr the Taft-Hartlcy Act,
3 LA . L.J. 167, 173-5 (1952).
10. See National Labor Relations Act, § 10(c), 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (Supp. 1951).
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outside the scope of Section 7, the employer would be free to discharge or
otherwise discipline the recalcitrant employee.
Workers may refuse to cross picket lines in two situations: where the
picket line surrounds a worker's own place of employment; and where it
surrounds the plant of another employer. A recent opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,11
suggests that in the former situation Section 7 protection will be withheld
from members of an employer-recognized union who independently refuse
to cross the picket lines of another union. The employer involved owned
two separate plants which were each represented by a different union."-'
Although he was conducting negotiations with the union in one plant,10 that
building was picketed by members of the other union. 14 And eight employees
of the picketed plant, acting independently and without union authorization,
refused to cross the picket line to their place of employment. The court held
the employer justified in demoting them for their actions. Not only did the
refusals fail to qualify as "concerted activity,' 5 but they also lacked the requisite
"mutual aid or protection."' 16 The court treated the workers as wildcat strikers
-who may be discharged or disciplined for their misconduct-on the view
that their unauthorized work stoppage could impair their own bargaining
agent's authority.17
The Illinois Bell case appears to be the first time the courts have specifically
considered the situation of a worker who, without authorization of his recog-
11. 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951).
12. Employees in his Chicago plant were represented by the Chicago Telephone
Traffic Union (CTTU) ; those in the downstate plant by the Illinois Telephone Traffic
Union (ITTU). Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1182-3 (1950) (inter-
mediate report).
13. The union in the Chicago plant (CTTU) did not strike. A previous agreement
between the Illinois Bell Telephone Co. and the CTTU had expired on March 29, 1947,
but the parties were operating under an extension agreement while negotiating a new
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1173.
14. Illinois Bell's downstate employees struck and picketed both their own and the
company's Chicago plant. Ibid.
15. "The record discloses unmistakably that each acted in her own individual capaci-
ty." NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 189 F2d 124, 127 (1951). The court rejected
as "novel" the theory that the eight employees were acting in concert with the pickets.
Id. at 129.
16. The court concluded that the eight employees were not acting for their own
"mutual aid or protection" since their conduct "could have only been for the benefit of
those in a different bargaining unit." Ibid.
17. Id. at 128-9. For other cases denying protection to wildcat activities see NLRB
v. Warner Bros., Inc., 191 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Reynolds Pen Co., 162
F2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945);
NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Brashear Freight
Lines, 119 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1941). For discussion of the "wildcat" cases, see Note,




nized union bargaining agent, refuses to cross picket lines around his own
place of employment.18 Although protecting such unauthorized refusals would
have the advantage of permitting workers to make decisions tailored to their
individual needs and preferences,19 it would also have serious disadvantages.
If the individual worker is allowed to make such vital decisions independently
of his union, the employer will be less likely to look to the union as a
responsible bargaining agent. As a result, stability of labor-management re-
lations may be impaired.20 Furthermore, an individual may not give sufficient
consideration to the serious consequences that may flow from his decision not
to cross. Since in these situations virtually all workers will be faced with the
problem of crossing the picket line, a relatively large number may refuse to
report to their jobs. Thus there is a real likelihood of a complete or partial
work stoppage causing serious injury to the employer. And such a stoppage
may force other union members-even a majority-to suffer wage loss with-
out their consent.2" Instead of relying upon individual decision, however, the
union of the workers faced with crossing the picket line in most cases could
call a sympathy strikeY2 Should they decide to strike as a body, they would
all become economic strikers--entitled to protection under Section 7. But
1M. There had been one prior NLRB decision involving this fact situation. Columbia
Pictures, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 56S (1949). But in granting protection the Board did not
specifically consider that the refusal to cross was in derogation of the order of the
workers' union, or that the picket line surrounded their own place of employment And
on appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed the Board. NLRB v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
et al., 191 F2d 217 (9th Cir. 1951). The court held that this action, running counter
to union orders, constituted unprotected wildcat activity.
Since the Illinois Bell case the Board, in a similar situation, granted § 7 protection
to unauthorized refusals to cross. Brown & Root, Inc., 99 N.LR.B. No. 153
(June 27, 1952). The Board arrived at its decision without mentioning the Illinois
Bell case, which had not been argued. Communication to the Y=u LA': JoUIMiAL from
David P. Findling, Associate General Counsel, NLRB, dated Oct. 14, 1952, in Yale Law
Library.
19. With some workers, refusal to cross involves almost a moral decision. In addi-
tion, certain employees may have a very close social relationship to the pickets.
20. For a discussion of the adverse effect of .ildcat sit-down strikes capable of tying up
entire plants upon other union members and upon the stability of colicetive bargaining,
see PErERSO.N, AZxMcA LABOR Umo:s 224 (1945).
21. A minority of union workers may thus, in effect, have the power of calling a
strike despite the fact that most union constitutions require a two-thirds vote and other
procedural safeguards before such a step can normally be taken. See note 23 infra.
22. If the pickets are employees in the same plant, a union-authorized sympathy
strike could not be attacked as proscribed secondary pressure under § 8(b) (4) (A)
of the Taft-Hartley Act. See Santa Ana Lumber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 937 (1949); Di
Giorgio Wine Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 720 (1949); and note 31 infra. But if the pickets are
employees of another employer, a sympathy strike to support them would be illegal
secondary pressure. See Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strires and Boycotts
-A Nrew Chapter, 37 CopuE.L L.Q. 235, 245 (1952). The situation in the Illinois Bell
case seems to be a borderline question since the pickets worked in a different plant, though
for the same employer.
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before calling such a strike, unions generally would carefully consider the
consequences of their action and make a decision by majority vote.23
The disadvantages of individual action suggest that NLRA protection should
be withheld from members of a recognized union bargaining agent who inde-
pendently refuse to cross picket lines around their own employer. By treating
such unauthorized refusals to cross as unprotected activities, the Illinois Bell
case would seem to limit action open to union members under such circum-
stances to an authorized sympathy strike. To this end the conclusion reached
is desirable. The major weakness of the decision-the unduly technical
interpretation of the wording of Section 7 2 '-could have been easily avoided.
There is ample precedent for denying protection on purely policy grounds
even to worker activities admittedly constituting "concerted activity for mutual
aid or protection.1
25
23. "Practically every union constitution contains some statement regarding the
calling and conduct of strikes. In general, the purpose of such clauses is to minimize
hasty and ill-advised action .... In order to call a strike the majority of unions require
a two-thirds affirmative vote of the membership affected, and sanction by the international
president.... Many stipulate that the vote shall be by secret ballot at a special meeting
of the members which has been anounced a given number of days in advance, and which
is attended by at least one fourth of the total membership affected." PFmTRsoN, Sunvr
OF LaOR EcoN OMIcs 555, 556 (1947).
24. The Seventh Circuit's standard of "concerted activity" is unwarrantedly restric-
tive. "So far as appears, the NLRB has always considered as 'concerted' any parallel activity
involving more than one employee. . . . Cf. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 818 (1949)." Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secom-
dary Strikes and Boycotts-A New Chapter, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 235, 250 n.74 (1952). See
also NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948) (two
salesmen complaining to their employer concerning the selection of a new cashier; held.
engaged in concerted activity). Even where one worker refused to cross a picket line,
other courts have found him to be in "concert" with the pickets. Cyril de Cordova, 91
N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950) (single employee refusing to cross picket line against another
employer).
In limiting employees' "mutual aid or protection" to specific demands for improvement
of their own working conditions, the court's view of labor benefits is unrealistically
narrow. Employees frequently gain from strike victories of other workers. Improved
conditions for one group of workers may facilitate improvement for others, particularly
in closely related employment. See NLRB.v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co.,
130 F.2d 503, 505-6 (2d Cir. 1942); Cyril de Cordova, 91 N.L.R.B. 1121, 1135 (1950) ;
PErERSON, SuRvEY OF LABOR ECONomics 296 (1947). A main producer often sets the
pace for the wages of the entire industry. HARRisON & DurI', PArEIxs OF UNION-
MANAGEMENT RMATIONS 182-3 (1947).
25. Thus protection has been denied to union unfair labor practices, Rawleigh Co.,
90 N.L.R.B. 1924, 1927 (1950) ; to violations of federal law, Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB
316 U.S. 31 (1942); American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944); to breaches of
contract, NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); and to various other types of
disfavored worker conduct, United Auto Workers of America, AFL v. Wisconson E.R.
Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) ("quickie" strike); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U.S. 240 (1939) (sit-down strike); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (slow-
down); Massey Gin & Machine Works, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948) (partial strike).
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NOTES
But the same reasoning will not justify denying protection to similar action
by workers not members of a recognized union bargaining agent. Under such
circumstances, the courts have consistently protected workers refusing to
cross. 2  Although their conduct might be open to the same objection of poten-
tially serious injury to the employer and other employees, it would in no way
be wildcat activity in derogation of the authority of any bargaining repre-
sentative. And since such employees are not represented by a union of their
own choosing, they have no effective alternative method of expressing support
of the pickets. So refusal to protect individual action would deprive them
of all action.
Where a picket line surrounded the plant of an employer other than the
worker's own, a recent opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
ILRB v. Rockaway Ne.ws Sztpply Co.127 denied protection under Sectiun 7.
A deliveryman had been fired for refusing to cross a picket line around a plant
at which he was required to pick up newspapers. Although conceding that a
refusal to cross a picket line under such circumstances xwas a "concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection" within the meaning of Section 7,25 the court
denied protection for what it considered overriding policy considerations.
With Judge Clark dissenting, the majority opinion declared that the worker's
right to refuse to cross must be subordinated to his own employer's right to
set reasonable working rules.-
Judge Clark's dissenting view, that the refusal to cross should be protected '0
in this situation, seems more persuasive in terms both of congressional intent
and underlying policy considerations. In making secondary boycotts union
unfair labor practices,3 ' Congress specifically exempted a refusal by any
For general analysis of protected and unprotected concerted activities, see Cox, The
Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 I'm. L.J. 319 (1951); Petro, Concerted
Activities-Protected and Unprotected, 2 LAB. LJ. 3 (1951) ; Note, Azailability of NLRA
Renedies to "Unlall" Strikers, 59 HAv. L. REv. 747 (1946).
26. NLRB v. Montag Bros. 140 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1944); Carter Carburetor Corp.
v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944) ; NVest Coast Casket Co., 97 N.LR.B. No. 103
(Dec. 29, 1951) ; New York Tel. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 383 (19.50).
27. 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 21 U.S.L. Wnux 3115 (Oct. 23, 1952).
Contra: Cyril de Cordova, 91 N.LR.B. 1121 (1950).
28. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 1953).
29. Ibid.
30. "[lVhen [Congress] limited the weapon of the boycott it took pains to except
from the newly defined unfair labor practices of a union or its agents the crossing of a
picket line ... . When, therefore, the Board acts in what seems to me the intended
spirit of this specific § 8 (b) (4) exception to hold that a union memb2r doss not loe
the statutory protection..., I do not see how we can rule that action erroneous as a
matter of law." Clark, J., dissenting in NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d
111, 115-6 (2d Cir. 1952).
31. The category of union unfair labor practices was created by the Taft-Hartley
Act. Secondary pressures by unions are proscribed by § 8(b) (4) (A), which makes it an
unfair labor practice for them "to engage in . . . a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture process, transport or othr,,ise handle
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person to cross a picket line around an employer (other than his own).82 Thus
Taft-Hartley distinguishes between refusals to cross picket lines around the
worker's own employer and around another employer. Only the latter type
of refusal is exempt from a union unfair labor practice charge.31 Although
not conclusive of protection under Section 7, the express exemption seems
indicative of a desire to provide such protection.
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services
where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products
of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person ... ." 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (Supp. 1951). The
legislative history of this section may be found in NLRB, LEGIsLATIvE HIsToRY OF TnL
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947 (1948). For interpretations of the cases de-
cided under this section, see Johns, Picketing and Secondary Boycotts Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 2 LAB. L.J. 257 (1951) ; Developments in the Law-Thc Taft-Hartlcy Act,
64 HAnv. L. Rxv. 781, 798 (1951).
32. "Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed to
make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer
(other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a
strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer
is required to recognize under this Act . . . ." 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(Supp. 1951). For a discussion of the Proviso, see VAN Ari=, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
LABOR MANAGE ENT RELATIONS Acr 1947, p. 52 (1947) ; Petro, The Enlightening Proviso,
1 LAB. L.J. 1075 (1950) ; Tower, The Puzaling Proviso, 1 LAB. L.J. 1019 (1950) ; SYN.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947).
The wording of the proviso poses several problems which, to date, have remained un-
solved. The proviso requires approval by an employee representative whom the employer
must recognize. In most cases this will mean the existence of a certified union. Employer
recognition (and Board certification) hinges on the existence of a union majority. This
in turn may depend on the appropriate collective bargaining unit to be considered. The
proviso does not make clear whether the union must bear the risk of these determinations
or whether a reasonable belief of the existence of a union majority will suffice.
Under a strict reading of the proviso it would seem to make no difference whether the
picket line is legal or illegal so long as it has the approval of a proper employee repre-
sentative. Thus in some circumstances workers honoring illegal picket lines may be
protected under the proviso. On the other hand, a primary recognitional picket line is
legal under the Taft-Hartley Act, even though there is no recognized union majority.
See SEN. REp. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). Workers refusing to cross such
a legal picket line would seem to be unprotected by the proviso.
Furthermore, the proviso inexplicably safeguards "persons," which includes workers
as well as unions. 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 152(1) (1946). Thus it seems to
protect more than is prohibited by § 8(b), since that section is applicable only to acts
of a union or its agents. One explanation for the use of "person" rather than "union"
is that the draftsmen were here thinking only of the individual as an agent of the union.
VAN A tKEL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, p. 52
(1947).
33. Even where the picket line surrounds one's own place of employment, refusal to
cross may, in some cases, constitute a proscribed secondary activity. See note 22 supra.
So it cannot be argued that inclusion in the proviso of refusals to cross lines around
one's own employer would have provided useless protection.
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NOTES
The policy reasons militating against protecting some independent refuials
by workers to cross picket lines to their own place of employment 34 are nut
generally applicable where the lines surround another employer. Under most
circumstances, granting protection in the latter situation will not too t.riously
injure the worker's own employer or his fellow workers. For, unlike the
picket line around the worker's own plant, only a limited number of worlzer,
are faced with the decision of whether or not to cross. Thus, a serious work
stoppage is unlikely. Also, where the picket line surrounds a plant other than
the worker's own, his union could not strike to back up his refusal to cross.
In the view of the Second Circuit, such a strike would constitute a proscribed
secondary boycott. 35 Since the denial of Section 7 protection under these cir-
cumstances will thus result in a complete withdrawal of the right to refuse
to cross picket lines-a right which Congress apparently did not intend to
withdraw when it banned secondar , pressures-protected independent action
is the only way this right can be exercised.
But even protection under Section 7 is inadequate for the worker forced
to make such an isolated decision. Although with such protection the employee
could not be fired directly for refusing to cross, the employer could force him
either to obey an order to cross or to remain out of work altogether as an
economic striker.36 If the worker were to go on such an independent strike, the
employer could permanently replace him.3 7 The rest of the union would be
unable to participate in the strike because of its secondary nature.3 3
And since only a few workers would ordinarily be striking, the usual impracti-
cability of replacement would not be a deterrent. So the employer, merely by
observing the proper formalities, would be able to negative the worker's right
of refusal.39 Under these circumstances, the court should graft an exception
to the employer's normal right of permanent replacement so as to permit
only temparary replacement of employees refusing to cross picket lines around
plants other than their own.40 The limited number of workers generally in-
34. See page 95 supra.
35. See NLRB v. Rockaxay News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1952).
36. See Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336, 337 (1951) ; Cyril de Cordova,
91 N.L.R.B. 1121 1137-8 (1950); Pinaud, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 235, 236 (1943).
37. See note 9 supra. To effectuate such "permanent replacement," the employer is
merely required to hire a substitute before dismissing the striking worker. See, a.g.,
Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 669 (1951).
3S. See NLRB -. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1952). The
possibility of union support might deter the employer from firing the recalcitrant employee.
The absence of this deterrent strengthens the power of the employer.
39. Retrospectively, it is sometimes difficult for the Board to determine whether, in a
particular case, replacement actually preceded dismissal. Such difficulties stem mainly
from the employer's ignorance of his rights. But an employer, aware of the proper
procedures to be followed, would have no difficulty in officially repacing an employee
before firing him.
40. At present, only employees striking because of an employer unfair labor practice
are given such treatment. In those cases the ioard often exercises its diecretion under
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volved would prevent such a requirement from offering too serious an obstacle
to the employer in maintaining operations. And the temporary loss of wages
would be a deterrent to rash action by the individual worker.
§ 10(c) of the NLRA to award the strikers back pay for time lost during the strike. Under
the instant proposal, however, employees choosing to strike individually rather than cross
picket lines would lose their pay while on strike.
